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"I think the bitter differences of the war are over."- George W. Bush[2] 
Introduction 
Much is accurate in the President's comment in late June, but it does not capture the full picture of trans-
Atlantic relations. Differences run deeper than Iraq, including Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the overall 
American approach to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). 
European leadership questions the American commitment to NATO, its support for the European 
process, and the value of supporting American policy in the face of popular opposition. At the same time, 
the U.S. military is stretched by concurrent operations. Continuing on this path risks arriving at a place 
where the United States is unable to maintain ongoing commitments, meet new dangers, or muster 
international support for its diplomatic and military policies. It risks arriving at a place where NATO is no 
longer an effective alliance, the United States is a less capable country, and international security is 
lower.  
 
This study, which is based heavily on discussions with diplomats and military representatives at NATO 
Headquarters, at the European Institutions, and in Washington, D.C.[3], is premised only on the national 
interest of the United States. It focuses on the benefits gained from its relationship with NATO allies and 
partners. NATO enhances American power[4], and NATO defense planning creates the ability for the 
United States to lead a coalition of willing and able states. Allies and partners develop their militaries to 
be interoperable in both equipment and operations.[5] Without peacetime planning and training, 
multilateral military operations would be inefficient or ineffective. A NATO operation also diffuses 
resistance toward the West as a whole, rather than leaving it targeted at the United States After the 
1940s and the chronic warfare that plagued the European continent, it was NATO that helped create an 
environment of European pacification and unification. The European Union acknowledges this on the first 
page of its own European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in December 2003: "The United States has 
played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO."[6]  
While the European peace is now self-sustaining, NATO also is the keystone to trans-Atlantic ties.  
 
Without NATO, the relationship between the United States and the European Union and its Member 
States would be no different than the relationship between any other set of states. Most importantly, 
NATO diplomacy, in concert again with the European Union, reinforces common liberal values advocated 
by the United States. The consensus of twenty-six members of the North Atlantic Council confers 
legitimacy to NATO operations that can never be achieved by an American-led alternative coalition. An 
American created "coalition of the willing" is seen by some Europeans and others as merely the United 
States and its cronies (or poodles in the eyes of those who disagree). A NATO coalition indicates the 
mutual agreement of the leading free states of the world, and in emergencies such as Kosovo, can even 
offer an alternative mandate to that of the United Nations (U.N.). Proceeding after working to achieve a 
common position among competing views demonstrates liberal values in action; striking out based on raw 
capabilities with the assistance of those who already agree demonstrates illiberal values and undermines 
what America tries to represent. 
 
NATO has been a good partner for its members, especially for the United States, for many years. Now, 
however, another organization attracts the loyalty of many NATO members: the European Union, which 
includes nineteen NATO allies as members. The Union is also a global actor, and aspires to be more of 
one in the future.[7] Current issues in the U.S.-NATO relationship have a different context than those of 
the past because Europeans-and only the Europeans-have another partner that can fulfill their national 
aspirations. The question of the moment is how NATO and the European Union can maintain a 
relationship with each other and with the United States. As the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS02) 
says, "There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the 
sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe."[8]  
Four Apparent Problems and Trends 
Four interrelated problems affect American relations with Europe.  
 
First, American policy—on Iraq and many other issues—is highly unpopular in Europe. European 
opposition to the war in Iraq and to President Bush in particular is well known.[9] The standard opinion of 
Bush, at least among politically interested elites, is consistent with the liberal views of American filmmaker 
and political activist, Michael Moore. This problem will not completely vanish if there is a President Kerry. 
European leaders (if not their publics) recognize that foreign policy differences with America began before 
the incumbent took office, and are likely to remain regardless of who wins the 2004 election. In fact, the 
hopes that Kerry would not be Bush may yield a backlash if his policies retain continuity with the present. 
Europeans perceive the United States as a country that acts unilaterally, meaning acting "without 
sanction by an international organization." Furthermore, Europeans do not believe a link between Iraq 
and terrorism exists, and they question the American military emphasis on the terrorism problem; the 
entire European perspective on the threat posed by terrorism and how to meet such a threat differs from 
American perspective.[10] Most Europeans regard terrorism as a long-standing problem, not a new one, 
and place greater emphasis on judicial response rather than military action.[11]  
 
Only the United Kingdom fully supported Bush's interpretation of the danger posed by Iraq. Other states 
joined out of a sense of duty and respect for the United States, displaying a need to stand with the United 
States as the leader of the free world.[12] They also joined out of a belief that standing with the United 
States would be good for their national interest, or even the interests and stature of their national 
leadership. Neither of these latter reasons is sustainable over time. The war has not been worth it for any 
partner or ally, since their electorates oppose the war and few, if any, tangible benefits have flowed to 
allies. Even the European sense of duty for the United States is fleeting. Unlike the European-American 
alliance following World War II, created and sustained by the Marshall Plan, contemporary European 
economic development is credited to the Union, not the United States. As the newest Member States to 
the European Union learn how to operate in the Union, they will find that their allegiance is not to each 
other, but to states similar in size and economic structure. They will become "old Europe" much more 
quickly than Americans appreciate.  
 
Second, our unpopularity comes at a time when we are asking for increased European help with military 
operations. American forces are stretched by the open-ended occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
combined with the need to maintain military commitments to Japan, South Korea, and NATO. In total, 
around 333,000 American troops are deployed worldwide.[13] Under the standard guidelines for 
deployment, reconstitution, and training—or simply a cycle limiting deployments to one year out of 
three—this means one million American soldiers are committed in total, out of a congressionally-
mandated end strength of just over 500,000. Even if 100,000 reservists were summoned for duty, a limit 
would seem to be in sight: America needs to either rotate troops more quickly, significantly increase the 
army's strength, or cut back on commitments.[14] Compounding the problem is the question of retention 
and recruiting, only partly and temporarily offset by stop-loss, bonuses, and the poor economy.  
Some missions may be able to be taken on by others, but there remains a finite amount of troops 
worldwide that can be called upon for any mission, anywhere. We can have the circle of stars replace the 
stars and stripes in Bosnia, but that in turn reduces the NATO and partner forces available for other 
missions. Europeans contribute more readily to the missions in Afghanistan than to those in Iraq. States 
have even suggested contributing to the war in Iraq by sending forces to Afghanistan to allow American 
forces to go to Iraq.[15] Yet material commitments have been limited. One American officer refers to this 
as a sort of "donor fatigue." The support is real—the war in Afghanistan was justified, reconstruction is 
vital, and the pursuit of al-Qaeda diehards must continue. But the resources are not there. If the United 
States turns to new coalition partners, these partners, as a group, may be less capable than the 
Europeans would have been. New coalition partners would not have interoperable troops, and the use of 
such a coalition would heighten the Europeans' sense of American neglect and disdain, which is high 
enough already. 
 
Third, our methods of addressing security concerns have led to fears that the United States does not care 
about NATO anymore. Increased European interest in security led to the development of a European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) formulated in the wake of Bosnia to help Europe overcome the 
"weakness and confusion" of its military policy.[16] It may seem odd to question the American 
commitment to NATO, but the facts support the allegation. The United States has not used NATO for its 
major operations since Kosovo, preferring to set up ad hoc coalitions. On 12 September 2001, the North 
Atlantic Council voted to invoke Article V against the previous day's attackers. Symbolically, the American 
response came in Secretary Rumsfeld's well-known comment that "the mission determines the coalition; 
the coalition doesn't determine the mission."[17] Thus Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) was 
conducted outside NATO auspices, with the alliance only coming in for the reconstruction under the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While allies have not been very forthcoming with forces 
for ISAF, the same is true of the United States. There seem to be two parallel missions in Afghanistan, 
with complementary tasks. The United States conducts one, without NATO; NATO runs the other, without 
many Americans. This allows other states to believe that the United States sees NATO as an adjunct to 
its security policy, suitable for peripheral missions but otherwise an irritant. If Europeans perceive that 
NATO is not important for the United States, then it is easier for them to reduce NATO's priority as well.  
 
Instead, they may believe that they must place a higher priority on their own capabilities in the Union.  
In addition, the United States seems to be changing NATO's mission away from collective defense, which 
remains the highest priority among many new members. These states share a different geopolitical reality 
than the United States. Their fear of terrorism is highly speculative. More than one indicated that they 
support the American policies primarily because they are resigned to that as a price one must pay for 
American protection. Afghanistan set a precedent that NATO will conduct missions far removed from the 
territory of its members. It appears that in U.S. military strategy, NATO stands for Nearly Anywhere 
Terrorists Operate. For Europeans, the desire to have NATO survive as an effective institution drives 
support for mission expansion more than the enthusiasm for the missions.  
 
Fourth, American negative reaction to the ESDP has raised European distrust of American policy and 
increased the unpopularity of the American public. The United States seems to simultaneously hold three 
incompatible views toward the ESDP. One is supportive, arguing that enhancements under EU auspices 
will help NATO burden sharing by making it easier for Europeans to develop capabilities that augment 
American national interests. Another view is apprehensive, arguing that the EU is going to develop a 
parallel structure that—intentionally or not—will weaken NATO and undermine American national 
interests. Yet another view is dismissive, arguing that the EU will never amount to anything and this is all 
a sideshow that takes our attention away from American national interests. These contradictions confuse 
Europeans, make it easy to caricature U.S. policy, and contribute to the unpopularity of American policy 
with which we began this discussion. Some argue that the United States has no policy all; others argue 
that the policy is schizophrenic: in either case, it is not effective.  
 
Europeans argue that the ESDP supports NATO goals. ESDP encourages the Europeans to develop 
enhanced military capabilities, which has been a priority in NATO for years. ESDP may have more appeal 
to the citizens and parliamentarians of some states because it is being done for Europe rather than to for 
NATO or for the United States. Some Americans fear that the Europeans will be unwilling to fund both 
NATO and ESDP assets. Since the forces are transparently available to both organizations, this fear 
distills to the overhead and to the planning and operational headquarters functions. It seems unlikely that 
the Union would abandon NATO interoperability without a lot of pressure being placed on the Member 
States. Union decisions in the area of foreign policy must be reached by consensus, just like NATO's. 
There are many states in the Union that do not want the EU to take on a collective defense role, including 
the United Kingdom and other U.S. allies. The allies believe NATO has proven itself and want to keep the 
United States involved. The non-allies want to remain neutral, and do not want the EU to force them into 
an alliance. Most states in the Union already plan their forces in compliance with NATO guidelines. They 
have little interest in converting to a different set of rules.  
 
Any of these problems, in isolation, would be difficult to manage. Taken as a reinforcing group, and in 
light of likely trends, they cannot be managed. Attainment of the goals of American National Security 
Strategy may require some tactical adjustments to American policies, including taking tangible action to 
meet European preferences. Before considering such adjustments, one must first dispel some of the 
arguments offered by those who would prefer to disregard European opinion. 
 
Counter-arguments 
There are many objections that can be raised to this assessment, most of them accurate but not relevant. 
Let us consider some of these before discussing the policy implications: 
 
The war in Iraq was a multilateral operation.  
 
True, in terms of the number of countries involved, and eighteen NATO members and aspirants publicly 
declared their support for the United States in January and February 2003.[18] The overwhelming 
majority of forces involved were American, however, to an even greater degree than the operations in the 
Balkans. More importantly, this is not what Europeans mean by "multilateral." In the liberal view of 
international politics proclaimed by most European countries, multilateralism implies a decision reached 
through an established due process, legitimate through its adherence to procedures. In March 2004, 80 
percent of Germans and 64 percent of British (against 41 percent of Americans) believed that a country 
should get U.N. approval before using force.[19] To carry through Robert Kagan's analogy, if the sheriff 
and his posse of townspeople catch the bad guys, bring them before Judge Roy Bean and then hang 
them from a tree, we have a fine multilateral operation led by a peace officer. If the sheriff and posse 
catch them and string them up directly, we have an illegitimate unilateral action by a dangerous 
gunslinger. The result is the same—even the participants may be the same—but the process confers 
acceptance and assurance that the sheriff is under control. 
 
Kosovo wasn't approved by the United Nations either, and the Europeans were on board with that.  
 
True, a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution would have been vetoed by China or Russia, 
so NATO acted on its own, arguing that the UNSC had already determined that Serbian actions were a 
threat to peace (much as the Iraqi war was tied to many prior UNSC resolutions). There are several 
differences between the operations, however. First, despite a lack of U.N. authorization, NATO acted as 
an institution of nineteen democracies. Not only did NATO approve it, but also the conduct of the war 
followed NATO procedures, a tortuous but successful process as detailed by then Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe General Wesley Clark.[20] That alone transformed it from a U.S. mission into a 
multilateral one. Second, the Europeans tend to be nervous about using Kosovo as a precedent. This is 
not mere posturing on their part—they believe a wider legitimacy is required, especially for operations 
outside Europe. Otherwise, it is too easy to portray the action as nothing but "the West against the Rest," 
a Christian crusade against Islam. Third, the Europeans regarded Kosovo as an emergency situation that 
required immediate action. Milosevic's forces were in the process of killing Kosovars, and even though 
the immediate consequence of hostile action was an increase in the humanitarian nightmare, one could 
perceive the need to act—returning to our posse, this is deadly force against the criminal caught in the 
act. The European states that opposed action in Iraq—and even many of those who agreed to support 
the action—did not see the same sort of urgency in eliminating Saddam Hussein. Finally, the scope of the 
Kosovo operation was much different. Iraq, from its start, was an invasion aiming at occupying Iraq and 
removing its recognized leader from power. Kosovo was a graduated effort to get Milosevic to change 
Serbian behavior. He remained in power for a while, ultimately turned over to an international tribunal that 
had indicted him according to a process set up by international agreement. 
 
Saddam was a really bad guy and the world is better off without him.  
 
True. Unquestionably true. This has absolutely no bearing on whether or not U.S. troops are stressed, 
whether or not the European public supports American policy, whether or not the United States is 
committed to NATO, or whether or not the United States has a clear policy towards Europe. The question 
of Saddam points out a fundamental difference between American and European Union thinking. The 
United States is project driven, the European Union is process driven. The United States cares about 
getting the job done, the European Union cares about how it is done. This difference may in fact be a very 
deep cultural divide, illustrated by other habits. American tourists tend to emphasize how many places 
they visit and how many pictures they take. European tourists tend to emphasize experiencing a place 
and a culture. Americans tend to want the food to be good (and often fast), no matter the surroundings; 
Europeans tend to want a prolonged culinary experience. 
 
The French, Clinton, and everyone else thought that Iraq had a prohibited weapons program.  
 
True, and it may yet turn out that some program may become known. The problem is, no one cares about 
that anymore. In large part, public suspicion is that the United States misled everyone, so his or her own 
leaders can be forgiven for being wrong. More to the point, the French view that inspections should have 
been maintained seems to have been vindicated. The public does not believe there was any urgent need 
to launch the war: no weapons, no ongoing upsurge in human rights violations, no recent invasions of 
other countries, and no increase in the disregard for United Nations resolutions. What, they asked at the 
time, was the problem with waiting a few more months for diplomacy—and they were not mollified by the 
American argument that our troops were getting very hot and tired sitting in the desert since they 
regarded the initial deployment as a bit presumptuous.  
 
Many European countries, and others, supported us.  
 
True, but the relevant question is whether or not they would do so again. They supported us because 
they wanted to stand with their prime ally and trusted the United States not to conduct an operation that 
was not fully justifiable to their people. The aftermath in Iraq and the lack of hard evidence supporting 
many of the arguments for war in Iraq have undermined that trust; the pain that the leadership of the 
supporting countries has gone through has reduced their incentive to stand with the United States. 
 
The French are up to no good.  
 
True, if by that we mean that they do not concur with the NSS goal that the United States should remain 
the single dominant force in international politics. They have clearly stated a preference for a multipolar 
world, and for the development of the European Union as an international actor. Chirac has called "for the 
Union gradually to assert itself as an active and powerful pole, on an equal footing with the United 
States."[21] Most famously, French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine said on November 7, 1999, "We 
cannot accept a world that is politically unipolar or culturally uniform. Nor can we accept the unilateralism 
of the single hyper power. This is why we are fighting for a multipolar, diversified and multilateral 
world."[22] It is not at all clear, however, that the French want to destroy NATO. It is very clear that the 
rest of the European Union would need to approve of such a project, which the other Member States will 
not do, unless driven to that point by American policy. As Gerhard Schröder said on December 28, 1999, 
the United States "lacked consideration for its allies… Whining about U.S. dominance doesn't help; we 
have to act."[23]  
 
The Europeans have no one else to turn to for security.  
True, unless they turn to themselves. We can, if we wish, mock the Europeans for believing that they live 
in a militarily safe world. However, they in fact do live in a militarily safe world. Russia is many years away 
from being a realistic threat to the Union, and there are no other countries that have a capability of 
attacking them with anything other than ballistic missiles. Europeans are threatened by terrorism, but they 
do not regard terrorism as primarily a military problem. They can cooperate among themselves without 
NATO, and even without NATO the Union and United States would retain an interest in cooperation. They 
are more than capable of building forces for any other contingencies. They lack the will because they lack 
the need. American policies should not be aimed at helping the European Union believe that it needs to 
become militarily self-sufficient. 
 
Relations with Europe are getting better anyway.  
 
True, on the surface at least, but it is a bit early to say this can be sustained.[24] There was little room for 
relations to deteriorate further. The United States has adopted some of the concepts discussed in this 
paper already, and none of the European states want a prolonged fight with the United States. They know 
they must work with the United States, and possibly President Bush, for many years. Relations look better 
because we have not asked the Europeans to do anything for us—other than expand ISAF, which isn't 
going well—and because we have started doing things they want, like getting a U.N. mandate for Iraq. 
 
We don't need NATO and Europe—we have the U.K. if we need anyone.  
 
True, but only in the most narrowly military and shortsighted sense. The British have been with the United 
States consistently, and other European contributions to Afghanistan or Iraq could possibly be matched 
by increased American forces (from an increased American military). It is difficult to see how that is a 
policy outcome we want, unless we actually prefer to fight wars alone or with increasingly less capable 
allies with non-interoperable militaries. This argument also assumes that the international diplomatic 
situation is static, as opposed to worsening despite the short-term improvements. 
Policy Comments 
If we are going to maintain a strong link with our European allies, the United States needs to recognize 
the impact of European positions on our security, and act to improve European opinion of American 
policy. 
 
As a first step, we need to stop betting against the trend. Much of American policy appears to be rooted in 
an optimistic present, assuming that things will get better before they get worse in the GWOT, in 
retention, and in Europe. This is not the trend. American forces are under stress, and that stress is likely 
to increase before it decreases. The mission will continue, the fighting will continue, and retention and 
recruiting and readiness will all suffer. The United States is unpopular, and it is not getting more popular. 
Perceptions of American lack of commitment to NATO grow as American operations exist in parallel to 
NATO or entirely separate from it.  
 
The most important trend of all is the growth—enlargement and deepening—of the European Union. The 
Union is real. Some people like to assert that the most important international relationship for every other 
country is its relationship with the United States. To the extent that is true, it—in fact—is a bit of a problem 
because the United States then is forced to seem to ignore some of those countries. More to the point, 
the most significant international relationship for every Member State is with the European Union. Europe 
provides its Members markets, jobs, money, rules, and laws. There is an indisputable element of 
Europeanization on the domestic politics of Member States. The impact of the Union on foreign policy is 
newer, but also can be detected.[25] The European Union is becoming an actor that the United States 
must learn to accept, respect, and treat as a diplomatic partner. 
 
As a second step, we need to make it clear that we support both the European Union and NATO. The 
State and Defense Departments need to adopt more of a focus on the Union as an actor rather than as 
an International Organization. It is not a state, but it is more like a state than it is like the U.N. This focus 
should be reflected in the internal organization of those departments and in the training and orientation 
provided. The Union is not simply a combination of its members. There is a Union sensitivity to process 
and procedures that is different from Member State political culture. Just as we would not send a 
representative to Japan without a thorough grounding in its culture, we need to train those who work with 
the European Union in its theory and culture. For all our differences, only Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand rival the Union in terms of its affinity to Western liberalism and culture. The European Union is 
not going to become what NSS02 seeks to avoid: an adversary of the United States. It will be a partner, a 
colleague, and an experienced advisor. At the same time, it is important that the United States 
demonstrate its commitment to NATO. The complications of coalition warfare are balanced by the gains in 
international goodwill and perceived legitimacy. An alliance is built on trust and commitment. If our allies 
do not see us using NATO, they may come to believe that they must learn to live without American 
security guarantees. They may come to question why they are supporting NATO, if NATO is simply a 
toolbox for American security priorities. Ultimately, we must persuade them that we see ourselves as part 
of a "team" of Western democracies, not as a prima donna who stands apart from and above the rest. 
As a third step, we should de-emphasize the unilateral option and conduct elective wars only with an 
institutional mandate. Everyone knows the option exists, and everyone reserves the right to act in national 
interest. This is like a husband telling his wife that he reserves the right to get a divorce if he doesn't like 
how the relationship is going. Technically this is true, but it isn't something you put in the wedding vows or 
anniversary card. The United States is doing the same thing when it proclaims that it will do what it wants 
with whatever countries it wants. If it becomes necessary to take unilateral action, do so. Just don't talk 
about it ahead of time—it is counterproductive.  
 
As a fourth step, we need to take a significant step to disprove European public beliefs. The American 
image among many Europeans is that of a country that believes it is above the law, the living incarnation 
of "the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must."[26] After Iraq and Abu Ghraib, it is 
too late for rhetoric to make a difference. Getting a U.N. mandate for the force in Iraq and withdrawing the 
2004 UNSC Resolution seeking ICC exemptions are seen as things the United States was forced to do, 
thus without moral value. Only a significant concrete step will now convince the Europeans to revise their 
image of American policy.  
 
Only three possibilities may be enough: resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, or joining the International Criminal Court (ICC). Of these, the Kyoto 
Protocol has significant flaws in terms of verifiability, equity, and effectiveness—and substantial and well-
funded domestic opposition. It also is not very relevant to the specific problem. Resolution of the Middle 
East conflict is much more relevant to Europeans and to the problem, but resolution of this problem may 
well be beyond American control right now, and it is difficult to envisage a peace plan that would satisfy 
everyone. The ICC, on the other hand, presents much less danger than what is portrayed, and speaks 
directly to the questions now being raised: respect for international law and human rights. The principles 
of complementarity built into the Rome Statute protect those subject to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice. The only possibly vulnerable Americans are elected officials. This is more theory than reality, 
however. The ICC is dominated by states that share the values America professes. It does not want to 
persecute Americans. In any case, the ICC, like every organization, has its own interests to worry about. 
Prosecution of American officials would destroy the court, because its other members would not tolerate 
it. They all believe their leaders are safe from the ICC—if they are wrong, they will leave, just as we would 
leave if our leaders faced prosecution. 
 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights home 
page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each month, 
email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your address will be used 
for no other purpose. 
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